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executive summary
This article evaluates the implications of nuclear multipolarity and strategic 
complexity in Asia.
main argument
Ongoing changes in traditional state-to-state nuclear dynamics are reshaping 
international security in Asia. Today, Asia is a multipolar nuclear environment 
in which long-range nuclear weapons are joined by other systems with strategic 
effect, and in which countries hold different views about the role and utility of 
nuclear weapons. This article discusses the implications of these shifts from the 
Cold War to the present for several guises of stability, on the one hand, and for 
competition and conflict, on the other. Though each of these considerations 
leads to dangerous outcomes in isolation, their combined effect is even more 
deleterious. The implications of this analysis are deeply pessimistic, both for 
peace in general and for U.S. national security interests in particular.
policy implications
•	 Asia	 is	 likely	 to	 see	 vigorous	 competition	 in	 the	 strategic	 arena,	 ranging	
from increased offensive nuclear weapons to the development of advanced 
conventional offensive munitions and missile defenses. These technologies 
will	likely	continue	to	spread.
•	 Competition	between	Asian	states	is	likely	to	lead	to	increased	reliance	on	
nuclear threats, bluster, and statecraft. This will erode any “nuclear taboo” 
and will increase the chance of nuclear weapons detonation.
•	 Arms	control	is	unlikely	to	substantially	mitigate	any	of	these	concerns	in	
the current environment.
•	 Given	 the	 pessimistic	 factors	 outlined	 above,	 increased	 understanding	
across states of how each sees the utility of nuclear weapons will be 
extremely beneficial.
•	 Missile	 defenses	 systems	 make,	 on	 balance,	 a	 positive	 contribution	 to	
regional security; nevertheless, their negative implications should be 
addressed through judicious use of transparency about nontechnical 
aspects of the systems.
•	 Expansive	 national	 security	 goals	 such	 as	 regime	 change	 should	 be	
abandoned, given the potential for catastrophic nuclear escalation.
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T he	Cold	War	continues	 to	constrain	 thinking	about	nuclear	 issues.	 In	the first 20 years of the Cold War, a dynamic nuclear environment posed 
great	risks	of	truly	catastrophic	war.	Yet	by	the	end	of	the	50	years	of	bipolar	
rivalry, many argued that nuclear weapons had stabilized Soviet-U.S. relations. 
Traditional deterrence theory, with its emphasis on calculating rationality, 
seemed to contribute to Americans’ understanding of world events. Certainly 
the latter years of the rivalry saw the rise of arms control efforts within and 
beyond the nuclear arena that facilitated the end of the Cold War. Throughout 
that period, the two primary nuclear powers developed sophisticated national 
security apparatuses with an increasingly deep understanding of the efficacies 
and	dangers	of	nuclear	weapons.	Few	of	 these	 factors	 speak	 to	 the	nuclear	
environment in Asia today.
It	is	increasingly	clear	that	the	second	nuclear	age	is	upon	us.1	Much	work	
on this epochal shift focuses both on the role of asymmetry in nuclear balances 
and on the role of nonstate actors.2	Indeed,	some	analysts	characterize	this	
situation in pejorative terms: an advanced set of nuclear “haves” declaring 
less developed latecomers to be the primary source of danger in the nuclear 
order	smacks	of	hypocrisy	and	Orientalism.3
This article argues that these elements of the second nuclear age, while 
important, are complemented by three ongoing changes in traditional 
state-to-state nuclear dynamics that are even more important: the nuclear 
environment is multipolar, long-range nuclear weapons are joined by other 
systems with strategic effect, and many countries hold different views about 
the role and utility of nuclear weapons. These three changes are manifest most 
clearly in Asia since the Cold War. While each change leads to dangerous 
outcomes in isolation, their combined effects are even more deleterious. 
Consideration of these three factors challenges the more positive conclusions 
that currently dominate analysis of Asian nuclear affairs.4 The implications of 
 1	 Colin	S.	Gray,	The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and Paul 
Bracken,	“The	Second	Nuclear	Age,”	Foreign Affairs	79,	no.	1	(January/February	2000):	146–56.
 2 For a good summary, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (April 2010): 1–33.
 3	 Hugh	Gusterson,	“The	Second	Nuclear	Age,”	in	Anthropology and Science: Epistemologies in 
Practice, ed. Jeanette Edwards, Penny Harvey, and Peter Wade (Oxford: Berg, 2007). That said, there 
has	always	been	a	degree	of	hypocrisy	in	the	nuclear	order.	In	fact,	such	hypocrisy	is	foundational	
to	the	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	Treaty	(NPT)	regime.	See,	for	example,	William	Walker,	“Nuclear	
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,” International Affairs	83,	no.	3	(May	2007):	431–53.
 4 The best study is the comprehensive volume edited by Muthiah Alagappa. See Muthiah Alagappa, 
ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008). For a forceful defense of optimistic conclusions regarding the region, see 
Muthiah	Alagappa,	“Reinforcing	National	Security	and	Regional	Stability:	The	Implications	of	
Nuclear Weapons and Strategies,” in Alagappa, The Long Shadow,	508–44.
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this analysis are thus deeply pessimistic, both for peace in general and for U.S. 
national security interests in particular. 
This article proceeds as follows:
u	 pp.	54–56	lay	out	the	baseline	for	a	comparison	of	the	present	environment	
in Asia with the Cold War
u	 pp.	56–67	characterize	the	nature	of	the	“three	dimensions	of	complexity”	
in Asia empirically: nuclear multipolarity, multidimensionality, and the 
different utilities of nuclear weapons in various countries 
u	 pp.	67–75	assess	the	analytic	implications	of	these	issues,	first	in	isolation	
and then the more problematic interactions across the three areas
u	 pp.	75–78	draw	conclusions	and	implications




would have been no guarantee of future outcomes had the Cold War continued, 
nor if similar situations had characterized other periods and dyads. 
Through at least the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was great flux in attitudes 
toward nuclear weapons. One study of a cross-national set of senior leaders 
highlights	this:	“All	the	statesmen	treated	in	this	book	displayed	ambivalence	
with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear war. At one time or another, each 
spoke	or	wrote	of	nuclear	weapons	as	weapons	that	might	actually	be	used,	and	
yet,	at	some	other	time,	spoke	of	nuclear	war	as	impossible	or	unthinkable.”5 
Beyond the question of basic utility, the range of roles conceived for weapons, if 
they were used, varied widely in those early years of experience with the bomb. 
In	part	because	of	this,	and	in	part	because	of	the	intense	rivalry	between	
the Soviet Union and the United States, crises in Berlin, Korea, and Cuba all 
raised the prospect of large-scale nuclear conflict.6 The rapid growth of the 
superpowers’ arsenals through the 1960s increased the scale of devastation 
 5	 Ernest	May,	“Introduction,”	in	Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 
1945,	ed.	John	Lewis	Gaddis	et	al.	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	5.	
 6 On early Cold War crises, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 
Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Matt Jones, 
After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge	University	Press,	2010);	and	John	Lewis	Gaddis,	We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War 
History	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997).	For	the	mid–Cold	War	crises,	see	Richard	
Ned	Lebow	and	Janice	Gross	Stein,	We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993).
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that	any	conflict	would	wreck	as	well	as	engendered	its	own	set	of	dangers.	
Simple	mistakes	might	easily	have	caused	catastrophic	consequences.	Indeed,	
a cottage industry of research on accidents and mishaps involving weapons 
and their support systems showed the pervasive nature of such dangers.7
Thus, this article does not contrast Asia’s present with a Panglossian stable 
and secure Cold War. The point of this analysis is to note that, as bad as the 
Cold War was, the fundamental dangers it posed are only the baseline from 
which today’s Asia adds several layers of exacerbating factors. 
Nuclear “Optimists” and the Long Peace?
While	 the	 Cold	 War	 legacy	 emphasizes	 the	 risks	 of	 crisis	 instability,	
eventually nuclear weapons also brought a degree of clarity to the strategic 
rivalry in Europe. Because of the dangers of a crisis escalating to the nuclear 
level, both sides at times exercised more restraint than they might have 
otherwise.8 One multinational study emphasizes this “positive” contribution 
to the Cold War:
The	question…is	whether	evidence	regarding	ten	key	statesmen	
of the first decade or two of that era seems to match …the 
more conventional reasoning captured in the phrase “nuclear 
revolution”—that dread of nuclear war, not of war per se, 
transformed the calculus that had governed interstate or 
international relations ever since states and nations came into 
being.…[T]hese	 Cold	 War	 statesmen	 appeared	 to	 think	 that	
nuclear	weapons	were	 revolutionary	 in	 character.	They	 invoked	
the awful power of these weapons as a reason either for caution on 
their own part or for expecting caution on the part of others.9
Similarly, China’s development of a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s was 
not perceived as entirely negative; rather, “most American analysts saw 
the acquisition of nuclear status as inducing a great caution in the Chinese 
leadership.”10 
 7 Scott Douglas Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a recent combing of declassified literature by two 
retired airmen who specialized in handling nuclear warheads, see Michael H. Maggelet and James 
C.	Oskins,	Broken Arrow: The Declassified History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents,	vols.	I	and	II	
(Raleigh: Lulu.com, 2008).
 8	 For	the	most	famous	advocacy	of	this	argument,	see	John	Lewis	Gaddis,	The Long Peace: Inquiries 
into the History of the Cold War	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1987).
 9	 May,	“Introduction,”	3–4.
 10 Jones, After Hiroshima, 462. This positive attribute was coupled with other negative aspects, 
of course: “There was however a widespread belief that Chinese stature would be raised quite 
dramatically by its entrance into the occidental nuclear club. This might then both increase its 
attractiveness to revolutionary groups and generate political problems, as China’s neighbors came 
to feel intimidated and even coerced by the new strategic environment.”
[ 56 ]
asia policy
The central purpose of this article is not to resolve the debate between 
“nuclear optimists” and “nuclear pessimists.”11	Instead,	this	article	shows	that	
the optimist case is less positive in the contemporary Asian context than it was 
in the Cold War, while the pessimist case ignores some important elements 
applicable to Asia today. The optimist-pessimist debate, which is exemplified 
by the debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, is one in which the two 
lines of reasoning do not directly contradict each other; rather, the negatives 
of proliferation must be weighed against the positives. This article points 
out that both positions understate the dangers now confronting Asia. New 
changes in the strategic realm undermine the applicability of the so-called 
optimistic lessons drawn from nuclear affairs in the Cold War.
three dimensions of complexity
Three distinct changes characterize Asia today: the nuclear environment 
is multipolar, strategic competition is multidimensional, and countries hold 
diverging views about the utility of nuclear weapons. This section outlines 
these causes of nuclear complexity through a descriptive discussion of ongoing 
empirical change. The effects of these changes, both individual and joint, will 
be discussed later in the article.
Nuclear Multipolarity in Asia
During the Cold War, the two superpowers dominated the nuclear 
arena. French and British arsenals, whatever their rhetoric might have 
implied, primarily served to enhance the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence by lowering the nuclear threshold in any conventional Soviet 
invasion.12 China’s arsenal played a different role but was often viewed as a 
“lesser-included case” (and therefore was encompassed within any strategy 
to deter the Soviet Union) by the United States prior to normalization in the 
1970s and tacit alignment in the 1980s.13 Only in the 1980s did China begin 
 11	That	said,	key	sources	on	the	South	Asian	rivalry	explicitly	engage	this	debate.	See	Scott	Douglas	
Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd ed. (New 
York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2003);	Robert	Jervis,	The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: 
Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1989);	and	Alagappa,	
The Long Shadow.
 12	 Good	sources	still	primarily	emphasizing	the	Cold	War	legacies	of	these	forces	can	be	found	in	
John	C.	Hopkins	and	Weixing	Hu,	Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons 
Policies of France, Britain, and China	(New	Brunswick:	Transaction	Publishers,	1995).
 13 On the evolution of this relationship, see James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious 
Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	1998).
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to have anything approaching a deliverable force against distant strategic 
targets, and even then China’s nuclear ratio with the Soviet Union was 
extremely lopsided.
Asia today is clearly not characterized by nuclear bipolarity between 
a privileged two states and the vastly asymmetric holdings of others. As 
Muthiah Alagappa notes, “there is no comparable overarching global 
security dynamic in the present period.”14 Table 1 highlights the flattening 
and broadening of the distribution of nuclear capabilities over the past dozen 
years. A series of strategic arms control agreements has structured reductions 
in arsenals for Russia and the United States. An economic impetus for the 
former overlaid a shift in threat perceptions for both that greatly reduced the 
potential contributions of nuclear weapons to security for the two Cold War 
adversaries. These trends will continue as the New START Treaty, the recently 
ratified successor to the Cold War agreements, is phased in over five years. 
There is also an expressed desire by the United States to draw down nuclear 
forces beyond those levels, although domestic politics will complicate the 
process of achieving that goal.15 Elsewhere in the region, the nascent program 
in	 North	 Korea	 increasingly	 looks	 like	 a	 permanent	 fixture	 of	 the	 Asian	
security environment. The largest changes, of course, have come in South 
Asia.	Following	the	1998	nuclear	tests	by	both	India	and	Pakistan,	each	of	the	
two states has moved to develop a more advanced civilian energy program 
that will also provide added potential for arsenal expansion. Finally, China is 
engaged	in	a	substantial	modernization	program	of	its	historically	backward	
and modest arsenal. The recent growth in warhead numbers in China is 
significant.	In	sum,	these	changes	do	not	lead	to	parity	among	the	key	players	
but	have	attenuated	the	skewed	distribution	of	past	decades.16 
The numbers listed in Table 1, particularly for countries other than 
the United States, are highly suspect, and all depend critically on different 
definitions	 of	 what	 makes	 a	 warhead	 “operational.”	 Nevertheless,	 three	
conclusions are clear even from these rough estimates. 
First, the number of nuclear powers has doubled (if a bit of ambiguity is 
tolerated about what exactly that means). 
 14	Muthiah	Alagappa,	“Nuclear	Weapons	and	National	Security:	Far-Reaching	Influence	and	
Deterrence Dominance,” in Alagappa, The Long Shadow,	495.




 16 For an optimistic view about the future proliferation across the region, focusing on the domestic 
determinants of security identities, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia 
and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).







More recent estimates have concluded that these estimates are inaccurate; thus, an estimate of 170 might be 
more	appropriate	for	comparison.	That	said,	the	author	knows	of	no	source	that	directly	suggests	China	has	
reduced its overall arsenal size. 
TABLE 1




Russia 10,240 4,600 Missile, bomber, and submarine
United States  8,425 2,468 Missile, bomber, and submarine
China 170 (400?)* ~193 Missile, bomber (?), and submarine (in development)
Pakistan None? 70–90 Missile and fighter
India None? 60–80 Missile and fighter
North Korea None Several? Missile (?)
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Second, the disparity between the arsenals of the superpowers and those 
of the rest of the region has narrowed: the ratio between Russian and Chinese 
nuclear	 arsenal	 sizes	has	dropped	 from	50:1	 to	20:1;	 the	disparity	between	
the U.S. and Chinese arsenals has dropped from 40:1 to 10:1; and China 
holds a 4:1 advantage over the South Asian countries. Although these ratios 
remain lopsided, given that nuclear weapons do not create power through a 
linear assessment of force ratios, this narrowing of ratios is significant. Some 
political effects are gained from “minimal deterrence” postures—for example, 
the existence of more small-but-secure nuclear arsenals will increase the 
number of countries that can rely on them for existential threats. However, 
for	most	of	 the	 relevant	 countries—North	Korea,	Pakistan,	 and	 India—the	
security	of	 their	nuclear	 forces	 from	attack	by	 several	potential	 adversaries	
is questionable. Furthermore, this flattening of force ratios increases the 
potential for biased analysis to emerge. When a ratio is characterized by 
massive	disparity,	the	two	sides	are	likely	to	share	an	understanding	of	its	broad	
[ 59 ]
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parameters, even if national bias affects analysis at the margins. Less lopsided 
balances are harder for each side to evaluate without bias. When China had 
a dozen or two warheads that could reach the United States and faced tens of 
thousands of U.S. weapons, the only credible use for Beijing’s weapons would 
have been as an ultimate retaliatory response. As the gaps narrow, however, 
China	is	likely	to	find	new	options	for	engaging	in	nuclear	swagger.17 
Third, the trend lines suggest a further flattening of arms distribution; 
it	is	unlikely	for	domestic	budgetary	reasons	that	either	the	United	States	or	
Russia	will	avoid	further	cuts	in	nuclear	weapons.	Yet	all	the	other	powers	in	
Table 1 are increasing their arsenals. Continued rapid growth in the arsenals 
of	all	the	nuclear-armed	countries	is	possible;	North	Korea	is	likely	the	only	
country significantly constrained by quantity of fissile material.18 Trends 
have effects over time, of course, but even today, they convey political and 
perceptual	 power	 beyond	 the	 existing	 stockpiles.	 Concerns	 in	 the	 United	
States about the potential for China to race to parity emphasize this reality, 
and related questions from U.S. allies in the region have spawned extensive 
and unprecedented efforts to bolster extended deterrence with South Korea 
and Japan.
Additionally, it is important to highlight that Asian states are modernizing 
weapon	delivery	systems	across	the	board.	Some	modernizations	will	 likely	
stabilize power dyads, but most will not (as discussed in the next section). 
China	 has	 begun	 to	 develop	 a	 secure	 second-strike	 force.	 The	 People’s	
Liberation Army (PLA) already has fielded long-range solid fueled missiles 
that can be launched in minutes rather than hours. These DF-31A systems 
are also deployed on mobile launchers, further enhancing their immunity 
from	a	potential	first	strike	to	disarm	them	by	Russia,	the	United	States,	or,	
potentially,	 India.19 The PLA Navy is also in the process of deploying new 
ballistic missile–launching submarines (China’s “boomers” are the Type-94 
Jin-class boats).20 At some point, these will be equipped with a modern missile, 
the JL-2, which has long been in development.21
 17 There is clearly an element of this in the PLA Second Artillery Force, Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
 18	 Jeffrey	Lewis	argues	that	a	technical	ceiling	based	on	fissile	material	stockpiles	does	exist	for	China,	
although	this	level	is	much	higher	than	current	estimates	of	China’s	arsenal.	See	Jeffrey	G.	Lewis,	
The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age	(Cambridge:	MIT	
Press, 2006).
 19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., August 16, 2010).
 20	Office	of	Naval	Intelligence,	China’s Navy 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2007).
 21 See the shift in language in the 2010 Pentagon report emphasizing challenges in the development of 
the JL-2 system. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments.
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India	 and	 Pakistan	 are	 both	 improving	 their	 delivery	 systems,	 in	 the	
former	 case	 against	 multiple	 targets.	 For	 some	 time	 India	 has	 possessed	
various short-range systems in the Privthi missile family that are capable of 
hitting	Pakistani	targets.	More	recently,	New	Delhi	has	successfully	tested	the	
longer-range	Agni-III,	capable	of	hitting	Beijing	and	Shanghai,	three	times	over	





Middle	East,	 completed	 its	 first	 successful	 test	 launch	 in	 2004.	 Its	 shorter-
range	predecessor,	the	Shaheen-I,	 is	undergoing	guidance	improvements	to	
increase its accuracy and was most recently tested in 2010.23
North Korea, beginning from the lowest base, has also improved its 
capabilities.	In	1998,	2006,	and	again	in	2009,	Pyongyang	tested	its	longest-
range system, the Taepodong family (TD-1 in the first test, TD-2 in the 
subsequent	tests),	which	is	assessed	to	be	capable	of	reaching	Alaska.	While	
none of the tests suggested that the system is operational at the moment, 
North	Korean	scientists	acquired	important	knowledge	about	multiple-stage,	
long-range systems. Furthermore, the 2009 test seemed more promising 
than the previous attempts. Beyond the long-range programs, there are also 
developments primarily relevant to regional actors: in July 2006 and again at 
several points in the summer of 2009, Pyongyang launched multiple missiles 
from short-range systems that could be used to threaten South Korea, Japan, 
or hypothetically China.24 
Thus, across the region proliferation of weapons and delivery systems 
has accelerated in the post–Cold War era. Without even considering potential 
future players in the strategic competition—Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, 
Taiwan,	and	Indonesia,	to	name	a	few	serious	candidates25—the basic situation 
is vastly changed from two decades ago.
 22	 “Agni-III	Ready	for	Induction:	Antony,”	Times of India, August 9, 2010.
 23	 “Pakistan	Successfully	Test-Fires	Two	Ballistic	Missiles,”	Associated	Press,	May	8,	2010;	and	
“Pakistan	Tests	Long-Range	Missile,”	BBC News, March 9, 2004.




Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 67–96; and Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Nuclear 
Capabilities in Southeast Asia: Building a Preventive Proliferation Firewall,” Nonproliferation 
Review	16,	no.	1	(2009):	25–45.	On	space	capabilities	and	potential	delivery	system	capabilities	
developed therein, see James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional 
Dynamics, and Global Implications	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	forthcoming	2011).
[ 61 ]
twomey u nuclear multipolarity and other dangers
The Multidimensionality of Strategic Competition in Asia
Defining	strategic	weapons	is	tricky.	Atomic	and	nuclear	weapons	were	
originally recognized as having a strategic effect; that is, they could directly 
serve strategic rather than tactical or operational aims. Over time, a distinction 
emerged between strategic nuclear weapons—to be used against an opponent’s 
homeland—and	 tactical	weapons	 that	might	be	used	on	 the	battlefield.	Yet	
deterrence	 theorists,	policymakers,	 and	arms	control	proponents	 remained	
disproportionately focused on strategic nuclear weapons.26 Even after the 
advent of precision-guided munitions in the Vietnam War and the conceptual 
development	of	AirLand	Battle	in	the	1980s—a	framework	emphasizing	deep	
strikes	by	conventional	forces	on	the	rear	areas	of	the	battlefield—conventional	
weapons did not play a strategic role.27
Today, such a narrow focus is unwarranted. Not only do long-range 
nuclear weapons have strategic effect, but advanced conventional weapons 
might as well. Furthermore, in the strategic geography of Asia, distinguishing 
between non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons is problematic (a 
concern	 similar	 to	 that	 raised	 by	 German	 critics	 during	 the	 Cold	 War).	
Missile defenses opposing nuclear weapons clearly have the ability to mitigate 
the latter’s strategic effect. Biological and chemical weapons have also 
complicated	strategic	analysis,	leading	to	the	awkward	term	“weapons	of	mass	
destruction.” The more recent and more cumbersome term “weapons of mass 
effect”	conveys	an	even	broader	range	of	capabilities.	Space	and	cyber	attacks	
can directly target objects valued by an opponent without first achieving a 
battlefield victory.28 Thus, in addition to the modernization and proliferation 
of offensive systems in Asia, a range of other systems must be considered in 
assessing today’s strategic environment.
Most significant and prevalent among these are the effective defensive 
systems	 deployed	 throughout	 the	 region.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 differentiate	
between large area defenses that intercept the missile in the exo-atmospheric 
mid-course phase from point defenses that intercept closer to the intended 
 26 For a good overview of this evolution during the Cold War, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution 
of Nuclear Strategy,	3rd	ed.	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2003).	
 27 William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars: World War II, Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S.	Government	Printing	Office,	1985).
 28 On space security, see James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the 
Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
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target.29 Both categories of systems have enjoyed rapid development and 
deployment throughout the region.
The United States and Japan deploy the most successful area defense 
program, the Aegis SM-3 missile, which is capable of intercepting targets 
mid-course. To date, the current variant has succeeded in thirteen out of 
fifteen U.S. tests and is effective at ranges up to a thousand miles. Although 
the two countries are engaged in joint research to substantially increase the 
interceptor’s capabilities,30 the existing system already enables Japan to protect 
its home islands against a North Korean threat with only one or two Kongo-
class ships “on station.” Japan’s current fleet of six ships allows for adequate 
coverage	and	continual	time	on	station	if	Tokyo	chooses.31 China also recently 
tested an indigenous mid-course interceptor that would boast a large theater- 
or nation-sized defensive footprint, potentially paralleling the United States’ 
own national missile defense system.32 
Shorter-range systems are widely deployed throughout the region. The 
United States, Japan, and Taiwan deploy advanced point defense systems in 
the Patriot PAC-3 system. (South Korea has imported earlier Patriot models 
from	Germany.)	These	provide	a	narrower	footprint	of	defensive	coverage	but	
have	dramatically	increased	in	capability	over	the	past	twenty	years.	India	has	
begun technical consultations with the United States regarding purchasing 
Patriot or other systems and continues to develop indigenous systems as 
well.33	 Russia	 fields	 an	 advanced	 Patriot-like	 system,	 the	 S-300	 family	 of	
mobile missile defense batteries, which also has been purchased by China. 
In	the	near	future,	viable	boost	phase	interceptors	are	likely	to	be	fielded	
(SM-3,	block	IIB),	and	airborne	lasers	will	continue	to	be	tested.	These	will	
provide additional defensive capabilities, particularly facilitating additional 
“shoot-look-shoot”	tactics	that	will	dramatically	increase	the	effectiveness	of	
 29 A third category, also capable of defending large areas, contains those systems that intercept a 
missile while it is still in its ascent phase. These remain nascent technologies at present, although 





London, May 27–29, 2009).
 32 Russell Hsiao, “Aims and Motives of China’s Recent Missile Defense Test,” Jamestown Foundation, 
China Brief, January 21, 2010.
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defenses.	Japan	and	the	United	States	are	likely	to	be	the	earliest	adaptors	of	
such	technologies,	but	these	too	are	likely	to	spread.
Conventional offensive capabilities are also entering the strategic 
competition	 in	 ways	 that	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 differentiate	 between	
conventional and nuclear conflict than was the case during the Cold War. 
The	 advent	 of	 precision-guided	 munitions	 (PGM)	 in	 the	 1970s	 laid	 the	
foundation for mature short-range systems in the 1990s. Today, the range of 
such	munitions	is	increasing;	stand-off	air	strike,	penetrating	aircraft	(stealthy	
or conventional), or long-range missiles can deliver them. The United 
States, China, and Taiwan all now have missiles with conventional, long-
range	precision	attack	capabilities.34 The United States is actively pursuing a 
conventional	prompt	global	 strike	capability	 to	give	 the	military	 the	ability	
to	attack	targets	anywhere	on	Earth	within	little	over	an	hour.35 To do so, the 
United States may expand its ballistic missile force to include a conventional 
role	 for	 either	 the	 land-based	 Minuteman	 III	 or	 the	 submarine-launched	
Trident. China has deployed a significant conventional arsenal near the 
Taiwan Strait that provides political coercive options that transcend traditional 
conventional campaigns.36 Beyond that, the PLA possesses intermediate-
range	systems	that	can	target	Japan	and	U.S.	bases	in	Guam.	In	the	near	term	
it might also have the ability to target U.S. carriers, which would escalate any 
conflict dramatically. 
Both missile defenses and accurate, powerful conventional weapons 
complicate matters because each can serve roles that previously only nuclear 
weapons could handle. Both capabilities could be used to destroy an opponent’s 
offensive nuclear arsenal, whereas previously this was only achievable by a first 
strike	with	nuclear	weapons.	PGMs	can	also	be	used	 to	destroy	command,	
control,	communications,	and	intelligence	(C3I)	systems	in	rear	areas.	This,	
too, was generally a mission for nuclear weapons in the Cold War. (Although 
conventional weapons were used in wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle 
East to modest effect, against a great power, capable air defenses would have 
rendered	 such	attacks	very	 costly.)	Unquestionably,	 such	 systems	are	 a	 less	
escalatory option than using nuclear weapons to achieve the same goal. At the 
same time, that benefit comes with a cost: the clarity of the nuclear threshold 
 34	The	United	States	has	the	most	options,	with	the	Tomahawk	being	the	most	prominent.	China	
fields both the DH-10 cruise missile and the DF-21 (among other shorter-range systems). Taiwan’s 
Hsiung	Feng	IIE	has	recently	entered	service.	All	possess	precision	targeting.
 35 Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” 
International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 113–46.
 36 Christopher P. Twomey, “Limits of Coercion: Compellence, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Political 
Military Affairs” (forthcoming, 2011).
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is obscured. Thresholds serve an important purpose in war, limiting escalation 
in some cases.37 Without a clear and mutually understood threshold, the 
question of when a war has gone nuclear will be more complex: certainly, 
after a nuclear warhead has exploded through atomic fission, but would a 
conventional	attack	on	a	nuclear	missile	count?38	 If	a	North	Korean	missile	
is intercepted over the Pacific, does the United States assume that the missile 
was	armed	with	a	nuclear	warhead?	
Beyond these concerns, in many cases conventional systems rely on 
command and control systems that also perform a role in nuclear operations. 
U.S. satellites that replaced the Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning 
constellation from the Cold War now provide preliminary telemetry to missile 
defense systems. Chinese long-range over-the-horizon radars used to find 
U.S.	carriers	for	attack	by	conventional	ballistic	missiles	might	also	provide	
early warning capabilities. China’s Second Artillery Force is responsible for 
both conventional and nuclear-armed missiles. The separation of command 
and	control	links	between	the	two	sides	of	the	force	is	unclear.	
The point here is not to naively call for restraint in any such crisis but 
rather to highlight that new interactions between conventional and nuclear 
forces	are	now	likely	to	pervade	the	battlefield	 in	any	high	intensity	war	 in	
Asia. The nature of these interactions will be discussed further in the section 
on implications.
Divergence on the Utility of Nuclear Weapons
A final source of complexity in Asian strategic affairs is the wide range of 
views held regarding the role that nuclear weapons can and should serve in 
national security policy. The issue is not whether nuclear weapons are useful39 
but rather how the countries that have chosen to develop such expensive 
weapons perceive their utility. What role do nations in the region see their 
nuclear	arsenals	serving	in	the	context	of	national	security?	There	is	quite	a	
bit of divergence on this issue.
 37 On the importance of thresholds, see the discussion of focal points in Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1960),	57.
 38 During the Cold War, some scholars grappled with a similar issue. See Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent 
Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1992).
 39 For one side in this debate, see Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and 
the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization	53,	no.	3	(Summer	1999):	
433–68; and T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,	2009).	For	an	earlier	and	related	view,	see	John	Mueller,	“The	Essential	Irrelevance	of	
Nuclear Weapons,” International Security	13,	no.	2	(Fall	1988):	55–79.	For	an	argument	that	nuclear	
weapons cast a “long shadow” over regional security affairs, see Alagappa, The Long Shadow.
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It	 should	be	noted	 that	views	about	nuclear	weapons	have	varied	over	
time and space. For instance, during the Cold War there was a range of views 
on precisely this question between the United States and Soviet Union. David 
Yost	observes:
It	is	inaccurate	to	attribute	“the	development	of	strategic	doctrines	
to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint” to both the United 
States	and	the	Soviet	Union,	especially	if	this	is	taken	to	imply	a	
similarity	in	doctrine.	It	is	certainly	true	that	devising	doctrines	
of “strategic stability” through mutual vulnerability was a major 
preoccupation	 of	American	 strategic	 thinkers	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	
1970s. However, Soviet political and military leaders did not accept 
such doctrines as guidance for their own force development and 
strategic planning.40
Furthermore, during the Cold War, U.S. planning differed for the use of 
weapons in Europe and Asia:
The [Eisenhower] administration had tried to present the specific 
actions suggested by the blunt term massive retaliation in a slightly 
different	 form	 from	 that	 offered	 in	 Europe,	 where	 since	 1954	
NATO’s	shield	forces	had	acted	as	a	kind	of	tripwire	which,	in	the	
event of a large-scale Soviet offensive, would trigger the retaliatory 
nuclear response that was designed to deter aggression in the first 
place. Over the chance of a revival of a Communist aggression in 
Korea,	a	direct	move	into	Indochina,	or	any	attempt	to	seize	the	
offshore islands and Taiwan, the administration had been ready to 
assert it was prepared to use nuclear weapons, but that this would 
be in a selected and controlled manner and directed at military 
targets which were believed to be supporting the Communist 
forces	engaged	in	the	attack.41
Finally, the United States’ own position on the role of nuclear weapons has 
shifted over time.42 Nevertheless, as the Cold War carried on, this variation was 
reduced. While many “forms of deterrence…existed during the Cold War,” 
Muthiah Alagappa writes, “these however remained on the periphery because 
the Soviet-American confrontation dominated international security.”43 For 
the United States, views refined for the European context began to permeate 
 40	 David	S.	Yost,	“Analysing	International	Nuclear	Order,”	International Affairs 83, no. 3 
(May	2007):	549–74.
 41 Jones, After Hiroshima,	454.
 42 For a charting of these shifts during the Cold War, see Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two 
Generations	of	Nuclear	Strategists,”	in	Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). On more recent changes, see 
Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, 
no. 1 (April 2010): 1–33.
 43	 Alagappa,	“Nuclear	Weapons	and	National	Security,”	495.	See	also	Muthiah	Alagappa,	“Exploring	
Roles,	Strategies,	and	Implications:	Historical	and	Conceptual	Perspectives,”	in	Alagappa,	
The Long Shadow, 1–36.
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strategy toward Asia.44 However, the range of views in Asia today on the role 
of nuclear weapons is worse than the highpoints of variation along any of the 
above dimensions during the Cold War.
Several different purposes for nuclear weapons can be posited. Vipin 
Narang identifies “three distinct types of regional power nuclear postures: 
a catalytic posture, an assured retaliation posture, and an asymmetric 
escalation posture.”45 Building on this, at one end, nuclear weapons can 
deter the use of nuclear weapons against cities in a fight for national 
annihilation. Beyond that, in the context of a limited nuclear war, they 
might deter escalation to more complete nuclear war. Additionally, some 
view	nuclear	weapons	as	being	able	to	deter	large-scale	conventional	attacks	
on a state. On something of a separable dimension, nuclear weapons are 
central to most attempts to exert extended deterrence. Extended deterrence 
attempts	 to	 prevent	 attacks	 on	 a	 security	 partner,	 whether	 such	 attacks	
might be conventional or nuclear. 
For	instance,	a	recent	Russian	statement	not	only	makes	clear	Moscow’s	
doctrine of using nuclear weapons to deter major conventional wars short 
of global wars that involve Russia directly, but also hints at extended nuclear 
deterrence of conventional conflict involving others.46 Earlier statements from 
senior Russian officials were even more assertive.47	Given	the	country’s	arsenal	
of	 some	5,400	operational	 tactical	warheads	 (far	dwarfing	U.S.	 holdings	of	
about 200), these statements would carry great weight even if they were not 
reflected in official Russian policy.48
At the other end of the spectrum, North Korea sees some utility in 
possessing a rudimentary arsenal that is not “weaponized” in the sense that 
the United States would use the term (operational and capable of being 
ordered into service in hours or days). Not only does Pyongyang expect its 
arsenal to have some deterrent effect against conventional forces, but it also 
clearly tries to use its nuclear program for compellent power. This might be 
termed “existential coercive power.” 
 44 See Jones, After Hiroshima. 
 45	 Vipin	Narang,	“Posturing	for	Peace?	Pakistan’s	Nuclear	Postures	and	South	Asian	Stability,”	
International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 38–78. For other typologies, see Alagappa, 
“Nuclear Weapons and National Security,” 483. 
 46	 Nikolai	Sokov,	“The	New,	2010	Russian	Military	Doctrine:	The	Nuclear	Angle,”	James	Martin	
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), CNS Feature Stories, February 2010 u http://cns.miis.
edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm.
 47	 Luke	Champlin	and	Volha	Charnysh,	“Russia	Plans	Changes	to	Military	Doctrine,”	Arms Control 
Today, December 2009.
 48	 Kori	Schake,	“Tactical	Nuclear	Weapons:	Time	to	Reaffirm	NATO	Solidarity,”	Central Europe 
Digest, August 2, 2010.
[ 67 ]
twomey u nuclear multipolarity and other dangers
Also related to the utility of nuclear weapons is the size and nature of 
the arsenal required for a state’s given purposes. Again, here some variation 
is possible, ranging from a virtual arsenal (for example, Japan today and 
perhaps South Korea and Vietnam tomorrow), to the barest existing arsenal 
(North	Korea),	to	a	weaponized	force	(possibly	Pakistan),	to	a	secure	second-
strike	capability	(China),	to	a	force	able	to	engage	at	multiple	levels	of	warfare	
(the	United	States	 and	Russia).	 It	 is	 important	not	 to	neglect	 views	on	 the	
utility	of	 the	 least	 robust	of	 these	nuclear	powers.	States	 such	as	 India	and	
Pakistan	before	1998,	Israel	for	approximately	the	last	three	decades,	North	
Korea over the past several years, and arguably Japan today have found value 
in	possessing	a	vague	yet	not	fully	weaponized	nuclear	arsenal.	In	most	cases,	
political dynamics have highlighted the costs of moving toward weaponization 
and deployed forces. However, these states, even those with serious security 
threats, were willing to tolerate such nuclear ambiguity.
Table 2 attempts to capture this range of views on the utility of weapons 
and pair those views with countries in the region. Readers can certainly call 
into question the coding of this table. Nevertheless, this author would argue 
that the overall conclusion holds true that there are substantial differences 
across the region. The point here is not to affirm any of these beliefs but rather 
to note the wide variation in Asia today. As is discussed below, this wide 
variation raises a number of problems.
implications
Each element of complexity raises its own problems, which are summarized 
in	this	section.	In	general,	most	of	these	effects	increase	the	challenges	facing	
national security elites throughout the region, increase the prospect for 
dangerous security competition, heighten potential for miscalculation, and 
destabilize the region. Beyond that, the implications of these three individual 
elements will tend to interact, as discussed in a later section. 
The First-Order Effects of Proliferation
The simple quantitative increase in the number of nuclear arsenals has 
several effects. The most obvious effect is the increase in the number of 
potentially unstable dyads. Perhaps historically rare reasons restrained the 
intense rivalry of the Cold War, preventing it from degenerating into an 
intense nuclear war. Those factors, however, may not hold in other cases. For 
instance, there is strong evidence that some dyads in Asia do not share the 
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Source: For useful sources on the individual countries, see the country chapters in Alagappa, The Long 
Shadow;	Narang,	“Posturing	for	Peace?”;	Kapur,	“India	and	Pakistan’s	Unstable	Peace”;	Lewis,	The Minimum 
Means of Reprisal; and Terence Roehrig, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Motivations, Strategy, 
and Doctrine,” in Nuclear Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age,	ed.	Toshi	Yoshihara	and	James	Holmes	
(Washington,	D.C.:	Georgetown	University	Press,	2011).	It	is	from	these	sources	that	the	above	codings	are	
generally drawn.
Note: As the United States foresees no major conventional threat to its homeland, it does not currently focus 
on the utility of nuclear weapons against such a threat outside the context of extended deterrence.
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same characteristics as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Paul Kapur argues that the 
stability-instability paradox that may have held during the Cold War in Europe 
does	not	hold	in	South	Asia	today.	Instead,	Pakistan	views	instability	at	the	
nuclear level as beneficial to its bargaining leverage.49 The Cold War did not 
center on territory claimed as sovereign homeland, whereas the Taiwan issue 
serves to complicate Sino-U.S. relations. The Sino-Russian border is long, and 
the two sides’ strategic arsenals are located more closely to each other than the 
U.S. and Soviet arsenals were in the Cold War. Additionally, no Soviet leader 
was ever as novice to international politics as Kim Jong-un in North Korea 
is, and the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet Union was never under as much 
stress as that of the Communist Party in China or the North Korean regime 
today. These and dozens of other issues highlight potentially salient points of 
contrast with the Cold War.
Some scholars highlight the difficulties in attribution, not only in substate 
terrorism cases but also in multipolar rivalries.50	Yet	the	attribution	of	state-
led	attacks,	though	technically	challenging,	seems	less	likely	to	be	a	concern	in	
reality,	given	that	most	surprise	attacks	occur	at	times	of	heightened	tension.	
Still,	 the	difficulty	 in	 identifying	attackers	might	complicate	 issues	 in	 some	
circumstances.
More problematic is the inherent instability of rivalries among three or 
more players, a point not systematically evaluated in the existing literature on 
Asia.51	Game	theorists	characterize	a	“truel”	as	a	duel	to	the	death	between	
three	actors.	These	theorists	have	reached	several	conclusions	about	the	likely	
outcomes of such contests. First and foremost, in contrast to stylized duels, 
truels are highly vulnerable to the specific assumptions about the sequence 
of	 shooting,	 quality	 of	weapons,	 size	 of	 arsenals,	 knowledge,	 and	 range	 of	
strategies chosen.52	This	makes	generalizing	hard	for	mathematicians	but	has	
a very clear implication for policy analysts: the simplicity of a bilateral world 
is gone. Slight changes in weapons or strategy can have large effects on the 
perceived—and actual—balance.53 
 49	 Samir	Paul	Kapur,	“India	and	Pakistan’s	Unstable	Peace:	Why	Nuclear	South	Asia	Is	Not	Like	Cold	
War Europe,” International Security	30,	no.	2	(2005):	127–52;




including some discussion of extended deterrence). Alagappa, The Long Shadow.
 52 D.M. Kilgour and Steven J. Brams, “The Truel,” Mathematics Magazine	70,	no.	5	(December	1997):	
315–26.
 53 One other finding is that partnerships in the context of the three-way game are not robust.
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One manifestation of this is heightened competition due to uncertainty 
about	potential	adversary	coalitions.	In	a	series	of	studies,	Stephen	Cimbala	
used straightforward modeling to emphasize that states in Asia will be 
pressured	to	choose	risky	alert	statuses	and	force	postures	out	of	such	defensive	
concerns.54	More	 relaxed	 postures,	 such	 as	 launch	 after	 attack,	 could	 leave	
countries	with	 greatly	 reduced	 arsenals.	Of	 course,	 riding	out	 a	first	 strike	
is always dangerous. But in a multipolar context, states must be concerned 
about	 deterring,	 or	 retaliating	 against,	multiple	 adversaries	 after	 an	 attack.	
The	number	of	adversaries	a	state	might	face	is	also	uncertain.	In	a	crisis,	the	
existence of multiple potential enemies will heighten a state’s incentive to not 
absorb	a	first	strike	because	doing	so	will	reduce	an	arsenal	that	would	need	
to deter not only its primary, current adversary but also any other adversaries 
who might be tempted to enter the conflict soon thereafter. Both these 
scenarios are worse than the bilateral rivalry in the Cold War and will tend to 
catalyze more dangerous force postures. Thus, even if the optimists are right 
about their characterization of the Cold War, these dynamics are new and 
negative in the post–Cold War environment.
Modernization across the board paints something of a mixed picture. The 
development	of	a	secure	second-strike	capability	for	any	nation	would	reduce	
dangerous	mobilization	spirals.	Thus,	such	a	capability	is	likely	to	be	stabilizing	
in some contexts involving the United States and China. However, a second-
strike	capability	gives	China	substantial	advantages	in	competition	with	India,	
which previously might have been characterized by a two-sided minimal 
deterrent posture. Russia had hoped to balance conventional difficulties with 






the associated command and control systems. Thus, surface-to-surface ballistic 
missiles (SSBM), when armed, might under certain conditions enhance 
the	security	of	China’s	second-strike	force.	However,	several	factors	suggest	
this will not be the case. First, China has not developed detailed procedures 
 54	 See,	for	example,	Stephen	J.	Cimbala,	“Nuclear	Arms	in	Asia:	Theory	and	Policy	Issues,”	
Comparative Strategy	26,	no.	2	(March	2007):	127–40;	Stephen	J.	Cimbala,	“Anticipatory	Attacks:	
Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy 27, no. 2 (March 2008): 113–32; and 
Stephen J. Cimbala, “North Korea and Nuclear Danger: Context and Policy Options,” Defense & 
Security Analysis	25,	no.	4	(December	2009):	393–412.
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for the security (from unauthorized launch) and safety (from accidental 
launch) of its launch forces. On land the PLA has addressed these dangers 
through	maintaining	the	separation	of	warhead	and	launch	platform.	Yet	that	
approach will not be viable at sea, and so positive control of the warheads will 
need to rely on other approaches. The U.S. and Soviet experience was that this 
strategy is challenging. Second, based on hints from the U.S. Office of Naval 
Intelligence,	 the	 Jin-class	 submarine	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 be	 particularly	 quiet.55 
Rather than presenting the United States with an invisible retaliatory force, 
the	submarine	may	instead	be	an	easy	target	for	early	attack	before	it	eludes	
any	pursuing	attack	vessel	or	launches	its	missiles.	
The First-Order Effects of Increased Complexity of Strategic Forces
The increasing complexity of the nature of strategic forces leads to a 
different set of concerns. First, it greatly complicates assessments of the 




recognize that its offensive forces will have already been worn down by a 
Chinese	first	strike.	Precisely	the	same	calculation	has	to	be	made	by	China	
with regard to the United States. Russia may not be overly concerned about 
Chinese	missile	 defenses,	 but	 a	 larger-scale	 attack	 could	 achieve	 the	 same	
effect. Similarly, when assessing its ability to coerce South Korea and Japan, 
China now needs to consider these states’ missile defense capabilities.56	India’s	
missile defense, if technically effective, would also raise the costs for China of 
any coercive strategies. 
Taiwan, as often is the case, is in its own class. The island faces a much 
larger	number	of	missiles	 (up	 to	 1,150,	 according	 to	 the	Pentagon),	which	
are more limited in utility against other neighbors (Japan and South Korea 
are	 out	 of	 range;	 India	 and	 Russia	 have	 much	 more	 territory	 to	 disperse	
 55	 See	the	chart	in	Office	of	Naval	Intelligence,	The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy 
with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, August 2009), 22 u http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-
navy.pdf.
 56 While it is true that Japanese—as well as South Korean—systems could be easily saturated, two 
complications	arise	for	Beijing.	First,	its	holdings	of	intermediate-range	ballistic	missiles	(IRBM)	
are limited, consisting of 80 DF-21 variants and a declining number of older CSS-2 liquid fueled 
missiles	(declining	from	15–20	today).	Furthermore,	such	weapons	also	serve	deterrent	roles	
against	India	and	U.S.	regional	bases.	Thus,	not	all	weapons	can	be	used	to	saturate	Northeast	
Asian missile defense systems. For missile arsenal quantities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Military and Security Developments, 66.
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military targets across and their population centers are out of range). Thus, 
Taiwan	would	likely	face	the	full	scale	of	China’s	short-range	M-9/11	missile	
capabilities. Still, Taiwan’s advanced missile defenses do force Beijing to rely 
on a large offensive to achieve any given level of desired political effect. Small 
demonstrative	attacks	that	are	intercepted	may	well	backfire	on	China,	forcing	
Beijing to incur the political cost of being perceived as a violent aggressor 
without any associated benefit of signaling in blood to Taiwan’s leaders the 
costs of a particular course of action. Still, it is certainly the case that Beijing’s 
conventional coercive options against Taiwan are substantial.
There are, of course, potential responses to missile defense. At least part 
of	China’s	response	in	these	cases	is	likely	to	be	a	quantitative	build-up	that	
would	increase	the	potential	devastation	should	violence	break	out.	For	China	
and others, qualitative improvements, both penetration aids and maneuvering 
warheads, are also possible.57 These may restore the “balance” in actual fact, but 
they	are	likely	to	create	a	gap	in	perceptions.	For	instance,	both	the	defending	
nation	and	China	would	likely	be	overconfident	in	their	own	capabilities	since	
the precise capabilities of these systems would remain highly classified on all 
sides.58 This dynamic also exists between the United States and China (and 
perhaps	North	Korea).	It	is	furthermore	worth	noting	that	nuclear	optimists	
regarding the Cold War generally opposed missile defense as destabilizing 
such	balances	during	the	twentieth	century.	The	same	logic	would	make	the	
contemporary era in Asia worse as well.
In	 other	 areas,	 non-strategic	 nuclear	 weapons	 developed	 by	 Russia	 to	
ensure that its depleted conventional forces can withstand an advanced foe 
could also serve strategic purposes against some Chinese targets. The same 
case	could	be	made	for	Pakistan’s	non-strategic	nuclear	forces.	In	both	cases,	
missile	 defense	 systems	 in	 China	 and	 India,	 respectively,	 would	 further	
complicate	Russian	and	Pakistani	calculations	by	requiring	a	 larger	nuclear	
offensive to achieve the same degradation of opposing conventional forces. 
PGMs	 complicate	 the	 math	 of	 net	 assessments	 in	 some	 dyads	 even	
further. This is playing out in current U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations, 
and,	 indeed,	may	 even	 stymie	 future	 progress	 in	 that	 relationship.	 PGMs	
have also complicated Sino-U.S. relations. Despite China’s nascent move 
 57 For an optimistic view on the efficacy of such weapons, see the recent report from two long-time 
missile	defense	critics:	George	N.	Lewis	and	Theodore	A.	Postol,	“A	Flawed	and	Dangerous	U.S.	
Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control Today, May 2010.
 58 On a related form of overconfidence, misperception, and associated deterrence failure, see 
Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-
American Relations	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2010).
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to	mobile	 intercontinental	ballistic	missiles	 (ICBM),59 Beijing increasingly 
envisages	use	of	“strategic”	PGMs	both	against	 lesser	potential	opponents,	
such as Japan and Taiwan, and also against the United States. As the 
technology for such systems spreads, it may serve strategic needs for Russia 
and	India,	in	particular.	Again,	there	is	no	analogue	to	this	in	the	Cold	War,	




These uncertainties will be exacerbated when they span categories of weapons 
systems	because	making	 such	comparisons	 is	 cognitively	more	challenging	
than simply comparing numbers of deliverable warheads.60 Such perceptual 
gaps are dangerous and can lead to overly expansionist foreign policy aims or 
insufficiently robust deterrence attempts.61
Arms	 control	 will	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 materially	 reduce	 threats	 in	 an	
environment	of	multidimensional	strategic	forces.	In	the	Cold	War	the	Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty served as an important cornerstone of subsequent 
restrictions on offensive nuclear weapons. However, the quality of missile 
defenses has risen dramatically, so states will be loath to negotiate them 
away. The differentiation between strategic and non-strategic weapons was 
maintained in the U.S.-Russia New START treaty. Nonetheless, the U.S. 
side has made clear that subsequent negotiations, if they occur, will need to 
incorporate	non-strategic	 systems.	Similarly,	 regional	players	 from	India	 to	
Japan and South Korea view China’s non-strategic systems as quite strategic.62 
To the United States, however, these same systems would present an operational 
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The First-Order Effect of Divergent Beliefs of Utility
When two states understand the utility of nuclear weapons similarly, 
oblique threats are often sufficient. This helps to ensure nuclear weapons 
stay out of the center of any relationship.63 However, when there are wildly 
different perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons, states will also disagree 
about what utility such weapons confer in a crisis-bargaining situation. One 
way for states to express this will be to engage in more explicit nuclear bluster. 
Again, such activities were common in the early Cold War but waned later. A 
return	to	such	behavior	is	likely	in	Asia.	Indeed,	there	is	already	evidence	of	
exactly	that	in	North	Korean	and	Pakistani	behavior.
This trend threatens to erode norms that denigrate the utility of nuclear 
weapons. Explicit in the literature on nuclear taboos are policy prescriptions 
for the United States to avoid nuclear threats and, in general, to reduce reliance 
on nuclear deterrence. As Nina Tannenwald notes, “changing the discourse 
could also change the taboo.”64	 Increased	public	nuclear	bluster	 in	 times	of	
crises	pushes	 in	exactly	 the	opposite	direction.	Whatever	one	 thinks	of	 the	
durability of the nuclear taboo today, this will reduce its efficacy tomorrow.
The Interactive Effects of Multiple Changes
Beyond the direct effects of different individual elements of the 
three changes, those changes interact, greatly complicating the strategic 
environment.
The logic for restricting offensive and defensive systems in tandem 
for dyads that see stability stemming from mutual vulnerability is clear: if 
mutual vulnerability is an accepted goal of both sides, defensive weapons 
certainly can affect that objective.65 However, that logic no longer applies 
to many dyads. Arms control or even confidence-building measures in Asia 
need to deal not only with the challenges of multiple players but also with the 
inherent interconnectedness of offensive and defensive systems. Advanced 
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Arms races are also affected by both the numeric and qualitative changes 
described	 here.	 Arms	 races	 can	 spiral.	 For	 example,	 India	 could	 build	 up	
its	 arsenal	 in	 response	 to	 Pakistan’s	modernization.	 China,	 in	 turn,	might	
respond	to	India,66 raising concerns for either Russia or the United States (or 
both). Alternatively, a U.S. missile defense system aimed at reducing threats 
from North Korea is provocative to China and has shaped the country’s 
modernization plans.
Adding consideration of the final source of complexity, that of varying 
perceptions on the role of nuclear weapons, only worsens the picture. 
“Stability” in the nuclear balance during the Cold War had a few meanings, 
but to the United States such stability was the recognition that neither side 
had	the	means	or	intent	to	create	the	capability	for	a	disarming	first	strike.	
This balance is impossible to achieve when different countries conceive of 
different roles for their nuclear arsenals. Because some nations such as Russia 
and	Pakistan	 have	more	 substantial	 expectations	 about	 the	 role	 of	 nuclear	
weapons, as discussed in the previous section, they will rely on more advanced 
and larger arsenals. This will pose threats to the more modestly geared forces. 
While the usual example offered here is the threat posed to China by U.S. 
forces,	China	threatens	India	in	an	analogous	fashion.	
Finding a stable balance of nuclear capabilities is hard with two actors. 
It	is	harder	still	with	multiple	players	because	of	uncertainty	about	coalitions	
and the need to deter multiple actors. When there are different conceptions of 
the appropriate role of nuclear weapons, and therefore different implications 
for sizing and posture, these problems are greatly exacerbated.
conclusion
A	productive	debate	 began	 in	 1995	between	Kenneth	Waltz	 and	Scott	
Sagan weighing the dangers of nuclear proliferation.67 What this article 
argues is that even if we limit our analysis to essentially realist factors such as 
balancing	power,	first-strike	advantages,	and	interstate	coercion,	among	other	
factors,	the	outlook	for	avoiding	nuclear	conflict	is	deeply	pessimistic.	When	
coupled with the dangers surrounding misperception and command and 
control difficulties emphasized by Sagan, that pessimism is only deepened.
 66	The	barest	inkling	of	Chinese	concern	over	Indian	strategic	forces	is	now	apparent	at	various	Track	
II	meetings	in	which	the	author	has	participated.
 67 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
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“Expect things to get worse” is not a policy prescription per se, but this 
view does have several implications. First, whatever the role of the nuclear 
taboo	in	recent	times,	 it	 is	 likely	to	decline	as	the	dynamics	outlined	above	
encourage greater nuclear posturing and a more intense nuclear environment. 
As	 noted	 by	 Paul	 J.	 Bracken,	 nuclear	 weapons	 can	 be	 used	 without	 being	
detonated; the story of early Cold War diplomacy is riddled with examples of 
nuclear threats being used to serve coercive purposes.68 As states that have a 
more expansive view of the utility of nuclear weapons interact with those with 
a narrower view, such nuclear “use” will become more common, undermining 
one of the foundations of the nuclear taboo.




goals is warranted, but in general the high costs should be recognized.
Third, the implications for force posture are ambiguous and highly 
contingent on individual dyads. Clearly, different strategies can rely on different 
offensive weapons. Similarly, though missile defenses hold the potential—
under some narrow circumstances—to reduce the destabilizing dynamics, 
even they exacerbate some of the problems listed above. While modest missile 
defense is not particularly destabilizing in a “mutually assured destruction” 
dyad with large arsenals on both sides (and indeed may encourage stability 
by reducing concerns over unauthorized launches that would lead to total 
war), for states with existential views about deterrence, any missile defense 
system may be threatening. On the other hand, increased sensor technology 
available to all players reduces one set of inadvertent dangers (although at a 
cost to some strategies).
Finally, multilateral arms control agreements will not reduce these 
threats in the near term. Potential costs in terms of instability in peace and 
war have clearly remained high in the second nuclear age in Asia, but, as 
pointed out above, the challenges facing traditional arms control have 
risen substantially.69 Without a shared view of the role of nuclear weapons, 
cooperative steps to reduce their role will appear disproportionate to one 
side or the other. Of course, it is often the case that various parties view 
arms control agreements differently—for example, the value of the Nuclear 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime when it was initially constructed was 
different for the nuclear “haves” than for the “have-nots.”70 But there must 
be recognized, overlapping interests and available compromises for all sides. 
Given	the	wide	range	of	perspectives	about	the	utility	of	nuclear	weapons,	
even that understanding is absent. 
Furthermore,	traditionally	U.S.-Soviet	arms	control	was	remarkably	one-
dimensional: quantitative reductions in offensive systems. Because of the 
diversification of systems with strategic effect in Asia, that approach is simply 
not viable. Different states will be threatened by different forces and will find 
maintaining a range of forces to be reassuring for their own defense. The 
scope of offensive strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons, 
missile	 defenses,	 and	 conventional	 precision-strike	 systems	 each	 perform	
different roles for different players. Reaching common agreements about the 
appropriate	restrictions	for	each	seems	to	be	an	impossible	task.	That	concern	
has already arisen in U.S.-Russia negotiations, and the minor nonbinding 
reference toward broader issues (such as missile defense and conventional 
strike	 capabilities)	 almost	 provoked	 enough	 opposition	 to	 prevent	 Senate	
ratification of the New START Treaty in December 2010.
Add to this complication of multidimensionality the issue of 
multipolarity, and the challenges traditional arms control faces seem simply 
insurmountable.	 If	 two	 states—with	 somewhat	 similar	 experience	 with	
nuclear weapons—struggle to come to a common understanding of the role 
of other strategic systems, how much harder will it be for countries with 
different	strategic	cultures?	When	states	face	multiple	potential	adversaries,	
will	they	be	willing	to	negotiate	with	only	one?	Chinese	experts	have	alluded	
to exactly this concern, voicing reservations about restricting their arsenal in 
any negotiation with the United States and other NPT nuclear-weapons states 
while	India	remains	outside	this	regime	and	is	 free	to	expand	at	will.	Until	
there is a deeper understanding of the logic of different countries’ nuclear 
strategies and their interaction, such compromises will be hard to come by 
in	 Asia.	 Increased	 discussions	 by	 all	 parties	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 nuclear	
weapons and the means by which nuclear weapons serve this role will be a 
critical positive step.
At the same time, the challenges posed by an increasingly multilateral 
and complex Asia are so high that it is imperative for the United States both 
to be restrained in its goals in the region and to recognize the paramount 
 70	 Illustrating	this	“haves”	perspective	vividly	is	Michael	Rühle,	“Enlightenment	in	the	Second	
Nuclear Age,” International Affairs	83,	no.	3	(May	2007):	511–22.	Analysts	from	the	Non-Aligned	
Movement, for instance, would express quite a different view.
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importance of nonproliferation strategies, whether they come in multilateral or 
unilateral	guises.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	proliferation	of	technology—
ranging from nuclear energy to more conventional weapons systems—lies at 
the heart of this deterioration of stability in the region, both in general and 
in	the	nuclear	arena.	Policymakers	should	utilize	a	broad	set	of	tools	and	give	
high-level attention to what has at times been regarded as mundane regulatory 
structures in the sphere of export controls.
The	risks	from	nuclear	weapons	are	simply	higher	in	the	world	described	
in	this	article.	All	statecraft	balances	costs	and	benefits.	Goals	that	might	have	
been achievable a decade ago will not be achievable a decade in the future 
because	of	these	dynamics.	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	shift.	
